| By
early 1941 Japan was hurt in pride, purse, and potency as a result of
American political and economic measures taken to halt its expansion. In
March a new Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, was sent to Washington to
negotiate a settlement of Japanese-American differences. He was confronted
with a statement of four principles which represented the basic American
position in negotiations. These were:
- Respect for the territorial integrity and the
sovereignty of each and all nations;
- Support of the principle of noninterference in
the internal affairs of other countries;
- Support of the principle of equality,
including equality of commercial opportunity;
- Nondisturbance of the status quo in the
Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful
means.[3]
In retrospect, it seems obvious that there was
little likelihood of Japan accepting any of these principles as a basis
for negotiations. At the time, however, considerable and protracted effort
was made to resolve differences. Postwar evidence indicates that the
Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, as well as Ambassador Nomura were sincere
in their efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of the threatening
situation in the Pacific. It was not Konoye, however, who called the turn
in Imperial policy, but the Japanese Army. And the Army adamantly refused
to consider any concession that might cause it to lose face.
After Germany attacked Russia in June 1941, the
longtime threat of Soviet intervention in Japan's plans for expansion was
virtually eliminated. The Japanese Army moved swiftly to grab more
territory and to add to its strength. Southern Indo-China was occupied and
conscripts and reservists were called up. In the face of this fresh
evidence of Japanese intransigence, President Roosevelt froze all Japanese
assets in the United States, effectively severing the last commercial
contact between the two nations.
In October the Army forced the Konoye Cabinet to
resign and replaced it with a government entirely sympathetic to its
position.[4] The new premier, General Tojo,
sent a special representative, Saburu Kurusu, to Washington to assist
Nomura and revitalize negotiations. The Japanese diplomats were in an
untenable position. They were instructed, in effect, to get the United
States to accept Japanese territorial seizures on Japanese terms. Their
mission was hopeless, but behind its facade of seeming interest in true
negotiations, Tojo's government speeded up its preparations for war. As
far as the Japanese leaders were concerned, war with the United States was
a now or never proposition, since American-inspired economic sanctions
would soon rob them of the necessary raw materials, particularly oil,
which they had to have to supply their military machine.
The only event that might have halted Japanese
war preparations would have been a complete abnegation by the United
States of its principles of negotiation. On 22 November Ambassador Kurusu
received the third and last of a series of communiques from Japan setting
deadlines for successful negotiations. He was informed that after 29
November things were "automatically going to happen."[5]
As far as the Japanese were concerned
negotiations were at an end and the time for direct action had come. The
two Japanese envoys were carefully instructed, however, not to give the
impression that talks had been broken off. The stage had been set for
"the day that will live in infamy."
After an extremely thorough investigation of the
negotiations during this period prior to the outbreak of the war, a Joint
Congressional Committee summed up the duplicity of Japanese negotiations
in this succinct statement:
In considering the negotiations in their entirety
the conclusion is inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and
that her program of aggression was immutable.[6]
Japanese
War Plan[7]
Both
the United States and Japan had developed plans for war in the Pacific
long before December 1941. Each nation considered the other to be its most
probably enemy. There was however, a fundamental moral difference between
the respective war plans. The Americans planned for defense and
retaliation in case of attack; the Japanese intended to strike the first
blow. (See Map 1, Map Section)
Japan's prime objective was economic
self-sufficiency, and the prize she sought was control of the rich natural
resources of Southeast Asia and the islands of the East Indies, her
"Southern Resources Area." The Japanese were well aware that
invasion in this area would bring them into conflict with a coalition of
powers. The lands they aspired to conquer were the possessions or
protectorates of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands,
and the United States. By means of surprise attacks, launched
simultaneously on a half dozen different fronts, the Japanese expected to
catch the Allies off-balance and ill-prepared.
The obvious threat of war with Japan had not been
ignored by any of these Allied nations, but the tremendous advantage of
choice of time and place of attack rested with the aggressor. Japan
intended to strike during a period when most of the resources in men and
material of the British Commonwealth were being devoted to the defeat of
the European Axis partners. The Netherlands, which existed only as a
government-in-exile, could contribute quite a few ships but only a small
number of men to a common defense force. And the United States, most
certainly Japan's strongest enemy, was heavily committed to support the
Allies in Europe and the Near East. Moreover, that nation was only
partially mobilized for war.
The initial Japanese war concept did not envisage
the occupation of any territory east of
Tarawa in the Gilberts. All operations beyond the limits of the Southern
Resources Area were designed to establish and protect a defensive
perimeter. The cordon of strategic bases and island outposts was to
stretch from the Kuriles through Wake Atoll to the Marshalls and Gilberts
and thence west to the Bismarck Archipelago. The islands of Timor, Java,
and Sumatra in the East Indies were to be seized and Japanese troops were
to occupy the Malayan Peninsula and Burma.
The major force which might prevent or delay the
accomplishment of the Japanese plan was the United States Pacific Fleet
based at Pearl Harbor. Recognizing the threat posed by the American naval
strength, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, directed that a study be made of the feasibility of a
surprise aerial attack on Pearl, timed to coincide with the outbreak of
war. In February 1941, the first staff considerations of the projected
raid were begun, but the actual details of the operation were not worked
out until September when it seemed increasingly obvious to the Japanese
high command that war was inevitable and that they needed this bold stroke
to insure the success of initial attacks.
On 3 November the Chief of the Naval General
Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, approved the draft plan, and on the 5th
commanders of fleets and task forces were given their assignments. Orders
were issued to selected task force units to begin moving singly and in
small groups to Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles on or about 15 November. Ten
days later a striking
force, its core six large fleet carriers transporting the pick of the
Japanese Navy's planes and pilots, sortied from the secluded anchorage
bound for the Hawaiian Islands. The approach route lay well north of the
search areas patrolled by American planes based at Midway and Wake and out
of normal shipping lanes.
The tentative day of attack, X-day, had been set
for a Sunday, 7 December (Pearl Harbor time). Japanese intelligence
indicated that most of the Pacific Fleet would be in port on a weekend.
Tallies of the ships present at the Pearl Harbor Naval Base received from
the Japanese consulate at Honolulu were transmitted to the attack force as
late as 5 December. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the striking force
commander, received orders from Yamamoto on 2 December confirming the
chosen date. There was still time to turn back; if the approaching ships
had been discovered prior to 6 December they had orders to return. No one
saw them, however, and the carriers arrived at their launching point right
on schedule.
At midnight of 6-7 December, the Japanese
Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 informed its readers that a state of
war existed with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.
American
War Plan[8]
A
nation's war plans are never static. The constantly changing world
political scene demands continual reevaluation and amendment. In the
1930's, American war plans were concerned
primarily with courses of action to be taken in the event of a conflict in
one theatre and against one nation or a contiguous groups of nations. In
the so-called "color plans," each probably enemy was assigned a
separate color designation; Japan became Orange. With the advent of the
Axis coalition, American military men began thinking in terms of a true
world war. As these new plans evolved they were given the name Rainbow to
signify their concept of a multi-national war.
The United States was deeply involved in the war
in Europe soon after its outbreak, if not as an active belligerent, then
as the arsenal of the democracies. By the spring of 1941 American naval
vessels were convoying shipments of war materiel at least part of the way
to Europe and they were actively guarding against German submarines a
Neutrality Zone that extended far out into the Atlantic. The intent of
these measures and others similar to them was clearly to support Britain
in its war against Germany, Italy, and their satellites. There was little
question where the sympathies of the majority of Americans lay in this
struggle and none at all regarding the position of their government.
On 29 January 1941, ranking British and American
staff officers met in Washington to discuss joint measures to be taken if
the United States should be forced to a war with the Axis Powers. It was
regarded as almost certain that the outbreak of hostilities with any one
of the Axis partners would bring immediate declarations of war from the
others. By insuring action on two widely separated fronts, the Axis could
expect at the very least a decreased Allied capability to concentrate
their forces. The American-British conversations ended on 27 March with an
agreement (ABC-1) which was to have a profound effect on the course of
World War II. Its basic strategical decision, which never was discarded,
stated that:
Since Germany is the predominant member of the
Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the
decisive theatre. The principal United States military effort will be
exerted in the theatre, and operations of United States forces in other
theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort
... If Japan does enter the war, the Military Strategy in the Far East
will be defensive.[9]
The defensive implied in the war against Japan
was not to be a holding action, however, but rather a strategic defensive
that contemplated a series of tactical offensives with the Pacific Fleet
as the striking force. A new American war plan, Rainbow 5, was promulgated
soon after the end of the American-British talks. Almost the whole of the
Pacific was made an American strategic responsibility and the Army's
primary mission under the plan was cooperation with and support of the
fleet.
A listing of the contemplated offensive actions
of Rainbow 5, which included the capture of the Caroline and Marshall
Islands, would be interesting but academic. The success of the Japanese
raid on Pearl Harbor forced a drastic revision of strategy which
effectively postponed amphibious assaults in
the Central Pacific. Certain defensive measures which were mentioned in
the plan, however, were implemented prior to the outbreak of war and in
most of them Marine forces figured prominently.
Some of the Marine defense battalions, tailored
to meet the needs of garrisons for isolated island outposts, were already
in the Pacific by the time Rainbow 5 was published. The plan called for
the development of bases, primarily air bases, at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, Samoa, and Wake. All of these islands which were under control of
the Navy, were to have Marine garrisons. Guam, in the center of the
Japanese-held Marianas, which had long had a small Marine barracks
detachment, was decisively written off in the war plan; its early capture
by the Japanese was conceded. The rest of the islands were placed in a
category which called for defense forces sufficient to repel major
attacks.
The purpose of establishing bases on these island
was twofold. Samoa was to help protect the routes of communication to the
Southwest Pacific; Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, and Midway were to serve as
outguards for the Pacific Fleet's home port at Pearl. (See Map
1, Map Section)
Marine
Garrisons[10]
The
Navy did not start cold with its advance base development scheme for the
four island outposts of the Hawaiian Group. A blueprint for base expansion
in the Pacific had been laid out in the report of the Navy's Hepburn
Board, a Congressionally authorized fact-finding group which, in the
spring of 1938, made a strategic study of the need for additional United
States naval bases. The potential utility of Midway, Wake, Johnston, and
Palmyra was recognized,[11] and surveys
were conducted and plans made for the construction of base facilities,
airfields, and seadromes during 1939 and 1940. The responsibility for
developing garrison plans and locating coastal and antiaircraft gun
positions was given to Colonel Harry K. Pickett, 14th Naval District
Marine Officer and Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor Navy
Yard. The fact that Colonel Pickett personally surveyed most of the base
sites insured active and knowledgeable cooperation at Pearl Harbor with
requests from the islands for men and materiel to implement the garrison
plans.
Although they were popularly referred to in the
singular sense, a custom that will be continued in this narrative, each of
the outposts was actually a coral atoll encompassing varying numbers of
bleak, low-lying sand islands within a
fringing reef. Each atoll had at least one island big enough to contain an
airstrip; Midway had two. The lagoons within the reefs were all large
enough to permit the dredging and blasting of seaplane landing lanes and
anchorages for small cargo ships; Midway's and Wake's were also slated for
development as forward bases for the Pacific Fleet's submarines. Civilian
contractors were hired to build the naval base installations, but until
war actually broke out most of the work on the island defenses was done by
the men who were to man them, Marines of the 1st, 3d, and 6th Defense
Battalions.
The organization of the defense battalions varied
according to time and place of employment, but by late 1941 the standard
T/O called for a unit with more than 900 men assigned to a headquarters
battery, three 5-inch coast defense gun batteries, three 3-inch
antiaircraft batteries, a sound locator and searchlight battery, a battery
of .50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and a battery of .30 caliber
machine guns for beach defense. Midway was the only outpost that actually
drew an entire battalion, although Wake originally was slated to be
garrisoned by one. On Johnston and Palmyra the habitable area was so
limited that it was impossible to accommodate more than a small defense
detachment.
Some development work had been done on Wake and
Midway, the two northern islands, before the arrival of the naval
contractors' construction crews. In 1935 Pan American World Airways had
set up way stations for its Clipper service to the Orient on both Midway
and Wake and a relay station of the trans-Pacific cable had been in
operation on Midway's Sand Island since 1903. Most construction, like the
passenger hotel on Wake and the quarters for the airline's and cable
company's personnel, was of little military value.
Midway, which had the most ambitious base plan,
was also the first outpost scheduled to receive a Marine garrison--the 3d
Defense Battalion, which arrived at Pearl Harbor on 7 May 1940. The bulk
of the battalion remained in Hawaii for the next eight months while
reconnaissance details, followed by small advance parties, did the
preliminary work on supply and defense installations.[12]
On 27 January 1941, in the face of the threat posed by Japan's aggressive
actions, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed that the rest of the
3d Defense Battalion be moved to Midway, that detachments of the 1st
Defense Battalion be established at Johnston and Palmyra, and that the 6th
Defense Battalion, then in training at San Diego, move to Pearl Harbor as
a replacement and reserve unit for the outposts.[13]
On 15 February, the same day that the 3d
Battalion began unloading its heavy equipment at Midway, and advance
detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion left San Diego on the Enterprise.
At Pearl Harbor the detachment left the carrier and transferred to a
small cargo ship that steamed on to the southwest for 800 miles to
reach tiny Johnston where on 3 March two 5-inch guns, six Marines, and two
naval corpsmen were set ashore. After a few days layover to help the
caretaker detail get set up, the rest of the advance party (3 officers and
45 enlisted men) went on to Palmyra, approximately 1,100 miles south of
Oahu.
After the remainder of the 1st Defense Battalion
arrived at Pearl, small reinforcing detachments were gradually added to
the southern outpost garrisons as the islands' supply and quartering
facilities were expanded. On Johnston and Palmyra, as at Midway, the
civilian contractors' crews and construction equipment were heavily
committed to the naval air base program, and only occasionally could the
Marines borrow a bulldozer, truck, or grader to help out in their own
extensive schedule of defense construction. For the most part, the
garrisons relied on pick and shovel to get their guns emplaced and to dig
in the ammunition magazines, command posts, and fire direction centers
necessary for island defense.
Duty on the small atolls was arduous and dull
with little relief from the monotony of a steady round of work and
training. When a few hours off was granted, there was no place to go and
little to do; the visible world shrank to a few uninviting acres of dunes,
scrub brush, and coral surrounded by seemingly endless stretches of ocean.
The visits of patrol planes, supply ships, and even inspection parties
were welcomed. Under the circumstances, morale at the isolated posts
remained surprisingly high, helped perhaps by the prospect of action.
In so far as possible, the 14th Naval District
attempted to follow a policy of rotation for the men at the outlying
posts, replacing those that had been longest "in the field" with
men from pearl Harbor. In midsummer a groups of 1st Defense Battalion
personnel was sent to Midway to start the relief of the 3d Battalion and
on 11 September the 6th Defense Battalion arrived to take over as the
atoll's garrison. The 3d Battalion returned to Hawaii for a well-deserved
break from the grueling monotony and work of building defenses.
By August 1941 the work on the naval air base at
Wake was well along and the need for a garrison there was imperative. An
advance detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion arrived at the atoll on 19
August and immediately began the now familiar process of backbreaking work
to dig in guns, dumps, aid stations, and command posts. Again the
contractor's men and machines were largely devoted to work on the airfield
and the lagoon, and the Marines had to get along with the hand tools
organic to the unit. In late October reinforcements from the parent
battalion made the 2,000-miles trip from Hawaii to bring the garrison up
to a strength of nearly 400 men. The unit scheduled to be the permanent
garrison on Wake, the 4th Defense Battalion, arrived at Pearl Harbor on 1
December, too late to reinforce or replace the Wake Detachment. A most
important addition to the atoll's defenses did arrive, however, before war
broke. Twelve Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighter Squadron 211 flew in to
the airstrip off the Enterprise on 4 December.
Just before the Japanese attacked, the strength
of defense battalion personnel on outpost duty and at Pearl Harbor was:
| |
Pearl
Harbor |
Johnston |
Palmyra |
Midway |
Wake |
| |
Off |
Enl |
Off |
Enl |
Off |
Enl |
Off |
Enl |
Off |
Enl |
| 1st
DefBn |
20 |
241 |
7 |
155 |
7 |
151 |
-- |
--- |
16 |
406 |
| 3d
DefBn |
40 |
823 |
-- |
--- |
-- |
--- |
-- |
1 |
-- |
--- |
| 4th
DefBn |
38 |
780 |
-- |
--- |
-- |
--- |
-- |
--- |
-- |
--- |
| 6th
DefBn |
4 |
17 |
-- |
--- |
-- |
--- |
33 |
810 |
-- |
--- |
For armament the outposts relied mainly on the
organic weapons of the defense battalions: 5-inch naval guns, 3-inch
antiaircraft guns, and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. Midway had, in
addition, three 7-inch naval guns still to be mounted and a fourth gun at
Pearl Harbor waiting to be shipped. The breakdown of weapons strength
showed:[14]
| |
Midway |
Johnston |
Palmyra |
Wake |
| 5-inch
guns |
6 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| 3-inch
guns |
12 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
| .50
cal MGs |
30 |
8 |
8 |
18 |
| .30
cal MGs |
30 |
8 |
8 |
30 |
Although the list of weapons was imposing, the
garrisons were not strong enough to man them adequately; the standard
defense battalion of 1941, moreover, included no infantry.
In contrast to the garrisons of the Pearl Harbor
outposts, the 7th Defense Battalion slated for duty at Tutuila, main
island of American Samoa, was a composite infantry-artillery unit. The
battalion was organized at San Diego on 16 December 1940 with an initial
strength of 25 officers and 392 enlisted men. Its T/O called for a
headquarters company, an infantry company, and an artillery battery as
well as a small detail which had the mission of organizing and training a
battalion of Samoan reservists.
The islands of American Samoa had a native
population of almost 10,000 which could be drawn upon as a labor force and
for troops to back up a regular garrison. This was not the only
significant difference between the outpost atolls and Samoa, however. The
terrain of Tutuila, which was by far the largest and most heavily
populated of the islands, was mountainous and heavily forested, and its 52
square miles contained a number of areas that could be converted into
camps and supply depots. There was room for training areas and small arms
ranges. The fine harbor at Pago Pago, site of the U.S. Naval Station and
headquarters of the naval governor, could be used by large vessels. This
combination of harbor, elbow room, and an indigenous labor force, plus its
location along the shipping route to the Southwest Pacific, made Tutuila a
vital strategic base. (See Map
3)
During the spring and early summer of 1940, Major
Alfred R. Pefley of Colonel Pickett's staff made a thorough survey of
Tutuila and prepared a detailed plan for its defense. On 29 November the
CNO directed that defense plans based on Pefley's recommendations be
implemented immediately. The naval governor
was authorized to begin construction of coast defense and antiaircraft gun
positions. Most of the guns to be mounted were already in storage at the
naval station and the Bureau of Ordnance was directed to provide the
ammunition and additional weapons still needed.[15]
The primary purpose of raising the 7th Defense
Battalion was the manning of the four 6-inch naval guns and six 3-inch
antiaircraft guns provided for in initial defense plans. The wisdom of
including infantry in the battalion and making provision for reinforcement
by trained Samoan reserves can hardly be questioned. Tutuila was for too
large an island to be adequately protected by a relatively few big guns,
most of which were concentrated around Pago Pago harbor. Small beach
defense garrisons were needed all around the island shorelines to check
enemy raiding parties. It was intended that most of the Samoan reserves
would be equipped and trained with rifles taken from naval stores and used
in the beach defenses where their knowledge of the terrain would be
invaluable.
An advance party of the 7th defense Battalion,
which left the States before the unit was formally activated, arrived at
Pago Pago on 21 December 1940. The rest of the battalion made the
4.500-mile voyage from San Diego via Pearl Harbor in March, arriving on
the 15th. The next months were busy ones as guns were emplaced and test
fired, beach defenses were constructed, miles of communication lines were
laid, and trails were cut which would enable quick reinforcement of
threatened landing point.
It was midsummer before the first Samoan Marine
was actually enlisted, but many natives voluntarily took weapons training
on an unpaid status, continuing a practice begun by the naval governor in
November 1940.[16] The first native
recruit was enlisted on 16 August 1941 and the 1st Samoan Battalion,
Marine Corps Reserve, was a going concern by the time war broke. The
authorized strength of the battalion was 500 enlisted men, but this figure
could never be reached because of the great number of men needed as
laborers on essential base construction.
There was one factor of the defense picture at
Tutuila that matched the situation at Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. None
of these islands had, at the onset of war, and land planes. The Marine air
squadrons which were scheduled to join the defenders were either still in
the States or else based on Oahu, waiting for the signal that the
airfields were ready for use. That part of Marine Air which was in the
Hawaiian Islands was based at Ewa Field, located approximately four air
miles west of Pearl Harbor. Just prior to the Japanese attack, the units
stationed at the field were Headquarters and Service Squadron of Marine
Aircraft Group 21 (MAG-21); Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 232 (VMSB-232);
Marine Utility Squadron 252 (VMJ-252); and the rear echelon of VMF-211,
which had moved forward to Wake. Operational control of the Marine planes
in the Hawaiian area was exercised by the Commander Aircraft, Battle
Force, Pacific Fleet.[17]
Aside from the Marine forces in the Western
Pacific assigned to the Asiatic Fleet,[18]
the only sizeable Marine units in the Pacific not already accounted for
were guard detachments on Oahu and the 2d Engineer Battalion (less
Companies C and D) which had been sent to Oahu to establish an advance
amphibious training base for the 2d Marine Division. There was a 485-man
Marine Barracks at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard and 102 men assigned to the
barracks at the Naval Air Station at Ford Island. Marines provided the
guard (169 men) at the Naval Ammunition Depot at Lualualei in the hills
northwest of Honolulu. The defense battalions which were quartered in or
near the navy yard were under the operational control of the Commanding
Officer, Marine Barracks, Colonel Pickett.
There were an additional 877 Marines present in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December as members of the guard detachments of the
battleships and cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.[19]
In all, there were more than 4,500 Marines on Oahu that first day.
Footnotes:
|
| [1]
Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Senate
Doc No. 244, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Report
of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Parl Harbor Attack
(Washington:
GPO, 1946), herinafter cited as Pearl Harbor Rept and the
Committee's record of 39 volumes of hearings and exhibits, hereinafter
cited as Hearings Record; G.N. Steiger, A History of the Far
East (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1944).
[2] United Stats
Relations with China (Washington: Dept of State, 1949), 24.
[3] Hearings
Record, Part 2, 1103-1104.
[4] M. Kato, The
Lost War (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946), 48.
[5] Hearings
Record, Part 12, Exhibit No. 1, 165.
[6] Pearl Harbor
Rept, 49.
[7] Unless
otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Pearl
Harbor Rept; Hearings Record, Part 13, Exhibits 8-8D, Japanese
Records; USSBS (Pac), NavAnalysisDiv, Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington:
GPO, 1946), hereinafter cited as Campaigns of the Pacific War.
[8] Unless
otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Pearl
Harbor Rept; Navy Basic War Plan--Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), 26May41 and
Appendix I. Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, quoted in full
in Hearings Record, Part 33, Exhibit No. 4; MarCorps Plan C-2,
Rainbow No. 5, 5Jun41, Plans & Policies Div Files; M.S. Watson, Chief
of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations -- United States Army in World War
II (Washington: HistDiv, DA, 1950); S.E. Morison, The Rising Sun in
the Pacific 1931-April 1942 -- History of United States Naval Operations
in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), hereinafter
cited as Rising Sun in the Pacific.
[9] Para 13 of
ABC-1 quoted in Hearings Record, Part 33, 958.
[10] Unless
otherwise noted the material in this section is derive from CNO Serial
070412, 23 Jun41, "Policy regarding employment of Marine Defense
Battalions in the Pacific Area" (located at NRMC); CNO Serial 091812,
25 Sep41, "Employment of Marine Defense Battalions"; CO, 1st
DefBn ltr to OIC, HistDiv, HQMC, 29Dec43; CO, 3d DefBn ltr to OIC,
HistDiv, HQMC, 4Feb44; MD, 1st DefBn, PalmyraIs, Annual Rept of
Activities, 1Jul43; Hist of the 7th DefBn, 21Dec42; 1st SamoanBn, MCR,
Annual Rept of Activities, 1Jul42; LtCol R.D. Heinl, The
Defense of Wake
(Washington: HistSec, PubInfoDiv, HQMC, 1947),
hereinafter cited as Defense of Wake; LtCol R.D. Heinl, Marines
at Midway
(Washington: HistSec, PubInfoDiv, HQMC, 1948),
hereinafter cited as Marines at Midway.
[11] House Doc
No. 65, 76th Congress, 1st Session, "Report on the Need of Additional
Naval Bases to Defend the Coast of the United States, Its Territories and
Possessions" (Hepburn Board Rept), 3Jan39, passim.
[12] BriGen A.R.
Pefley notes on draft manuscript, 14Jan57. Since all fresh water had to be
distilled, the capacity of the distillers set the limit for the size of
the island garrison. In terms of water consumption each contractor's
workman took the place of a Marine. Adm C.C. Bloch ltr to ACofS, G-3,
HQMC, 7Jan57.
[13] CNO Serial
0618, 17Jan41, "Establishment of Permanent Marine Defense Forces at
Johnston, Midway, and Palmyra Islands."
[14] ComFourteen
Rept of Status of DefBns assigned to me 14th ND, 1Dec41 (located at NRMC).
Personnel figures include naval medical personnel assigned to he defense
battalions.
[15] CNO serial
054430, 29Nov40, "Defense of American Samoa."
[16] Gov of
AmerSamoa ltr to CNO, 13Feb41, "Establishment of Native Insular
Force."
[17] 2dLt B.
Hollingshead, "The Japanese Attack on 7 December 1941 on the Marine
Corps Air Station at Ewa, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii" (MS, HistDiv,
HQMC, January 1945), 3-8, hereinafter cited as Ewa Monograph. The
other squadrons assigned to MAG-21 were either at sea with the Navy's
carriers or still in the U.S.
[18] See Part
IV, "Marines in the Philippines,"
for the prewar situation
in China and the Philippines.
[19] The strength
of most Marine units on Oahu is listed in Hearings Record, Part 24,
Exhibit No. 40. "Location of regularly assigned commanding officers
of ships present during the Japanese attack of 7 December 1941." For
more information
on Pre WW2 Situation in the Pacific, go to: |
